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BELOW MARKET LOANS: FROM 
ABUSE TO MISUSE-A 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATION 
Phillip J. Closius* 
Douglas K Chapman ** 
Below market loans have been traditionally used as substitutes for gifts, salaries, 
and dividends for the primary purpose of tax avoidance in the transfer of wealth The 
Supreme Court's opinion in Dickman v. Commissioner subjected both demand and 
term loans in an intrafamilial setting to the federal gift tax. Congress, while subject-
ing all below market loans to either income or gift tax, applied different valuation 
formulas to term and demand loans and, in so doing. fal'Ored the use of demand 
loans as a salary substitute. This Article analyzes the current status of below market 
loans by examining their use in a typical business setting-the professional sports 
industry. Dean Closius and Professor Chapman argue that Congress should establish 
tax neutrality as between term and demand loans. This result can be achieved by 
providing an income tax for demand loans, by ascribing the borrower's below market 
benefit to the lender, or by statutorily imputing a term of years to all demand loans. 
INTRODUCTION 
BELOW MARKET LOANS l were first utilized primarily as tax-
avoidance substitutes for dividends and gifts. Directors of close 
corporations perceived such loans as a "tax-free" method of distrib-
uting money to shareholders, frequently themselves. Family mem-
* Associate Dean, University of Toledo College of Law. B.A., University of Notre 
Dame (1972); J.D., Columbia University School of Law (1975). 
** Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. B.S., Ohio State University 
(1971); J.D., Ohio Northern University School of Law (1974). 
1. A loan is a transaction in which a lender transfers money to a borrower based upon 
the borrower's promise to repay the principal amount. The repayment may be subject to a 
variety of terms and conditions, but the two common forms of repayment are a term of years 
(repayment of the principal amount at a time specified at the initial transfer) or a demand 
(repayment when the lender mandates a return of the principal amount). 
Traditional loans require the borrower to pay interest to the lender at some specified 
interval of time at a percentage rate agreed upon at the time of contract or at a percentage 
rate adjusted at certain periods of time according to a formula agreed upon at the time of 
contract. Loans which do not provide for the borrower to pay interest to the lender ("inter-
est-free" loans) or which provide for the borrower to pay a percentage of interest below the 
fair market rate of interest charged on similar types of loans are collectively referred to in this 
Article as "below market" loans. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text. 
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bers also realized that the federal gift tax filing and reporting 
requirements could arguably be ignored if the money furnished to 
the recipient were characterized as a loan rather than as a gift. The 
Internal Revenue Service (Service) attacked the tax-free treatment 
of below market loans in these contexts for over two decades.2 Un-
til quite recently, these challenges were unsuccessful. 3 Because the 
Service's attempts to tax these loans had failed, employers began to 
utilize below market loans as compensation for employee services. 
As interest rates rose and as the economy became more diverse and 
inflationary, employee compensation schemes at all levels became 
more complex than the simple salary. In this economic climate, the 
below market loan gained considerable popularity as a component 
of a negotiated compensation package.4 Under widely accepted 
case law interpretation, loans in the dividend, gift, or compensation 
contexts provided significant economic benefits to borrowers with-
out generating reporting or tax liability. 
From the taxpayer's standpoint, the use of below market loans 
made sound economic sense. Through such loans, the taxpayer 
could successfully shift income and the income tax liability to the 
borrower and easily circumvent an intricate anti-avoidance system 
in the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and case law.5 In 1984, how-
ever, the Supreme Court in Dickman v. Commissioner 6 altered the 
tax treatment of below market loans in the intrafamilial setting by 
effectively SUbjecting both demand and term loans to the federal gift 
tax. While the tax "exemption" for below market loans employed 
as a dividend or compensation substitute was literally unaffected by 
2. See infra notes 17-67 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 39-41, 63-72, and accompanying text. 
4. See, e.g., Keller, The Tax Treatment of Interest-Free Loans: A Two-Transaction Ap-
proach, 1 VA. TAX REv. 241, 241 n.2 (1981). 
5. !.R.C. §§ 671-678 (1982). Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Helvering v. Horst, 
311 U.S. 112 (1940); Susie Salvatore v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 89 (1970). The 
below market loan, particularly the demand loan, provided a device that avoided all the 
drawbacks of short-term trusts yet still allowed the taxpayer to "give away" the income-
producing property without having to relinquish "control" over the property. The taxpayer 
could call the loan at any time and immediately retake possession of the principal. The es-
sence of such a transaction was not in substance different from a short-term revocable trust, 
but judicial treatment allowed substantially different, favorable tax treatment to both parties. 
For a thorough analysis of the distinctions among these transactions, see Joyce & DelCotto, 
Interest-Free Loans: The Odyssey ofa Misnomer, 35 TAX L. REv. 459, 459-60 (1979-80). 
Perhaps an original attack on these transactions as substantively no different than a revocable 
trust would have avoided years of struggle. See also Comment, An Interest-Free Borrower or 
Lender Be: Gift Tax Implications of Interest-Free Loans, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 941, 952-54 
(1978). 
6. 465 U.S. 330 (1984). 
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Dickman, the "exemption" was at least questionable after that deci-
sion. These legal uncertainties were soon clarified by Congressional 
passage of section 7872 of the Tax Reform Act of 1984.7 The stat-
ute substantially altered the tax status of below market loans in all 
three contexts-dividend, compensation, and gift substitute-by in-
cluding them within the scope of either the gift or the income tax. 
This reform filled a substantial gap in taxation enforcement by lim-
iting the utility of a simple device that had allowed significant 
wealth transfers without corresponding tax consequences. None-
theless, Congress diminished the economic efficiency of the statu-
tory income tax effect by adopting a valuation procedure favoring 
demand over term loans.8 Congress should adopt additional reform 
legislation to subject demand loans to a meaningful income tax. 
This final step would achieve true neutrality by imposing a tax on 
both demand and term loans in the gift and income contexts. 
"Salary-substitute" below market loans rarely possess independ-
ent economic value as loans but rather utilize the loan format to 
provide compensation which avoids tax liability. Employees ob-
sessed with obtaining immediate tax benefits frequently negotiate 
below market loans. These loans may, in reality, economically dis-
advantage their long-term financial interests, especially if the loan 
repayment will be forgiven or accomplished by an accounting trans-
fer. Continued use of below market term loans as a salary substi-
tute reflects either taxpayers' ignorance of the impact of section 
7872 or their willingness to gamble on a lack of enforcement. The 
professional sports industry mirrors the national trend in the in-
creased use of such loans as part of an employee's financial package. 
Sports contracts are an excellent vehicle for examining both the eco-
nomic realities of these loan transactions and the true impact of 
reform legislation. 
This Article examines current tax treatment of below market 
loans by analyzing the case law which culminated in the Dickman 
opinion and the post-decision reform legislation.9 The Article then 
analyzes the practical application of these new rules by explaining 
the new income tax treatment of "salary substitute" below market 
loans.1O This Article investigates the below market loan in a partic-
ularized context-the professional sports industry. The Article 
concludes that, by favoring demand loans over term loans, section 
7. I.R.C. § 7872 (1984). 
8. See infra notes 91-107 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 12-89 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 90-136 and accompanying text. 
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7872 fails to provide the full uniform system of taxation needed to 
eliminate tax avoidance and to confine the use of the below market 
loan to situations where true economic considerations warrant its 
employment.11 
I. TAX TREATMENT OF BELOW MARKET LOANS 
Taxpayers use below market loans in compensation, dividend, 
and gift contexts. These contexts provide significant wealth transfer 
between taxpayers. In addition, these loans frequently have limited 
economic utility to the parties aside from the tax avoidance benefits 
potentially available by the loan format. Most lower courts, how-
ever, failed to perceive the absence of substance in this loan format 
and allowed large wealth exchanges to escape gift or income tax 
liability. These interpretations of the Code frustrated the enforce-
ment efforts of the Service and produced a significant loophole in 
the tax system. Increased use of the below market loan culminated 
in Supreme Court and congressional activity which reversed the ex-
isting case law and included below market loans within the scope of 
the gift or income tax. 
A. Case Law Development Under the Income Tax 
Code section 61 defines gross income as "all income from 
whatever source derived."12 The Treasury Regulations similarly 
define gross income as "all income from whatever source derived, 
unless excluded by law. Gross income includes income realized in 
any form, whether in money, property, or services."13 The Tax 
Court has stated that "[t]he income taxed is in sweeping terms and 
should be broadly construed."14 However, borrowed money is not 
considered income.15 Consequently, the incurring of indebtedness 
is not considered a taxable event. At its inception, the below mar-
ket loan was conceived as a method of distorting this legitimate ex-
emption from tax liability in order to provide tax-free income to an 
11. See infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. 
12. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1982). 
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (as amended 1979). 
14. Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931, 946 (1979), aff'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 
1982). The Greenspun court established this principle by noting that § 22 of the 1969 Code, 
the predecessor of the current § 61, "is broad enough to include in taxable income any ec0-
nomic or financial benefit conferred on an employee as compensation, whatever the form or 
model by which it is effected." Id. 
15. J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 56 n.2 (4th ed. 1981) (citing Dilks v. Commissioner, 
15 B.T.A. 1294 (1929); Stayton v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 940 (1935». 
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employee or shareholder. In a typical transaction the principal 
amount, characterized as a loan, was not reported as income by the 
borrower. The note frequently provided that no interest was due on 
the loan. The borrower therefore had full use of the principal 
amount for the loan period at no cost. The employer or corporation 
claimed no deduction for the loan. Neither the borrower nor the 
lender reported the transaction to the Service. 16 
The Service challenged this tax treatment of below market loans 
because of the economic benefit the loans conferred on the bor-
rower. The Service argued that since the borrower was relieved 
from paying market rate interest, he or she received transferred 
value. Income, therefore, should be imputed to the borrower in the 
amount of the unpaid interest. The landmark case in which the 
Service first asserted this position was J. Simpson Dean. 17 In Dean, 
the petitioner husband and wife were controlling shareholders of a 
closely held corporation. During 1955 and 1956, the petitioners 
had outstanding interest-free loans from their corporation in excess 
off our million dollars. 18 The Service charged them with income on 
the loans equal to interest at the then-prevailing prime rate. Several 
prior cases had held that rent-free use of corporate property consti-
tuted gross income.19 The Service argued that use of corporate 
property is indistinguishable from use of corporate money for less-
than-adequate consideration.20 
The Tax Court firmly rejected the Service's attempt to tax the 
imputed interest by holding that the petitioners were not required to 
recognize income from the interest-free loans.21 The majority dis-
tinguished the cases on which the Service relied from the facts in 
Dean on the ground that an actual taxpayer expense in the earlier 
cases to procure the benefit derived would not have been deduct-
ible.22 If the petitioners in Dean actually paid interest on the loans, 
they could have fully deducted that amount under section 163 of the 
Code.23 The Tax Court held that any "income" derived by the bor-
rower from this free use of the loan proceeds would be offset by the 
16. Since the borrower had no income from such a loan, he had nothing to report. The 
lender was not entitled to a deduction, so nothing would appear on her return. 
17. 35 T.e. lOS3, lOS7 (1961). 
IS. Id. 
19. Id. at lOSS. 
20. Id. at 1089. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 1090. 
23. Id. 
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"interest" deduction that they would have received.24 Therefore, 
no income resulted from the loan. The Dean decision solidified the 
favorable tax treatment which such loan borrowers received. Sur-
prisingly, the Service did not publish its nonacquiescence to Dean 
unti11973, twelve years after the opinion was announced.25 Dean 
increased the popularity of below market loans and effectively initi-
ated their modem use as tax-free compensation and dividend 
substitutes.26 
The Tax Court more fully analyzed Dean in Greenspun v. Com-
missioner.27 In Greenspun, the taxpayer received a loan at a three 
percent interest rate when the prevailing market rate was six per-
cent.28 The Service determined a deficiency in Greenspun's federal 
income tax on the theory that he had realized gross income in an 
amount equal to the economic benefit between the market rate of 
interest and the actual rate of interest on his loan.29 The Tax Court 
again rejected the Service's argument but altered its position slightly 
by holding that the Dean result was actually based on the conclu-
sion that "an interest free loan results in no taxable gain to the bor-
rower" rather than on an imputed interest deduction theory.30 The 
court reasoned that an interest-free loan from a corporation to an 
employee is substantively no different than a loan in which interest 
is charged and which is accompanied by an increase in compensa-
tion to pay the interest. To illustrate the point, the court formu-
lated the following hypothetical loan example: 
Assume that A, an employee of X Co., received as his only form 
of compensation an interest-free loan from X Co. in the amount 
of $20,000 for a period of 1 year. Further assume the prevailing 
interest rate at the time was 5 percent or $1,000 a year. The eco-
nomic effect of this transaction is the same as if X Co. had 
24. Id. Judge Opper, in a concurring opinion joined by three other judges, stated that 
the majority's "no taxable gain" conclusion was an overbroad generalization. Id. at 1091. 
He would have decided the case for the petitioners because the Service failed to prove that an 
offsetting interest deduction would not have been available to them. Id. at 1090-91. Judge 
Bruce's dissent disagreed with Judge Opper's evidentiary presumption. Judge Bruce believed 
that the petitioners had the burden of proving that, if they had been required to pay interest 
on the loan, they would have been entitled to an interest deduction. Id. at 1092. 
25. 1973-2 C.B. 4. 
26. There are no records to indicate how widespread was the use of interest free loans 
prior to Dean. With Dean, the Service began to seek out and to challenge such cases. The 
Dean decision probably so strengthened the taxpayers' position that the use of interest-free 
loans increased. 
27. 72 T.C. 931 (1979), aff'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982). 
28. Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 940. 
29. Id. at 941. 
30. Id. at 946 (quoting Dean, 35 T.C. at 1090). 
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charged A interest at 5 percent on the $20,000 loan, and at the 
same time, paid him a salary of $1,000 which A in turn used to 
pay the interest. Assuming no other facts, A would have gross 
income from his salary of $1,000 and an interest deduction of 
$1,000 or taxable income of $0.31 
The Service challenged this analysis by contending that the tax-
payer was not entitled to an offsetting interest deduction because 
the imputed interest was neither actually paid nor incurred.32 The 
court, however, justified its result by pointing to the economic real-
ity of the transaction.33 It nonetheless agreed with the concurring 
and dissenting opinions in Dean that not every interest-free loan 
would lead to the same result. For example, the result would have 
differed had the taxpayer used the proceeds of the interest-free loan 
to invest in municipal bonds. In that event, section 265(2) prohibits 
a deduction for interest paid on indebtedness incurred to purchase 
tax-exempt securities. The borrower's taxable income would equal 
the interest differential.34 Aside from that type of statutory limita-
tion, the Greenspun court effectively affirmed the Dean tax-free 
characterization of below market loans. The Tax Court and appel-
late circuit courts utilized the Dean and Greenspun holdings to re-
ject later attempts by the Service to tax the economic benefit of 
below market loan transactions.3s These opinions failed to provide 
a consistent rationale for exempting the loans from the income tax, 
relying instead on some variant of the Dean-Greenspun "no-gain" 
or imputed interest deduction theories. The courts' failure to enun-
ciate a clear supporting analysis reflected their misunderstanding of 
the loan structure. These below market loans frequently had little 
economic utility as borrowings to the parties but instead were em-
ployed solely as tax avoidance devices. As inflation increased com-
31. Id. at 948. See Keller, supra note 4, at 242. 
32. Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 950. 
33. Id. at 951. The Tax Court cited Revenue Ruling 73-13, in which a corporate officer 
received personal financial advice from professional financial advisors. Although deemed tax-
able as an economic benefit, the officer was entitled to a corresponding deduction under § 212 
even though he did not actually payor incur the advising expenses. The result was justified 
because the transaction was substantially analogous to the corporation's increasing the of-
ficer's salary and the officer's purchasing the deductible advice. Rev. Rul. 73-13, 1973-1 C.B. 
43. 
34. Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 948. 
35. Baker v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1982); Beaton v. Commissioner, 644 
F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1981); Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Estate of 
Liechtung v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1118 (1980); Hardee v. United States, 708 
F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In Hardee, the Court of Claims held that an interest-free loan 
from a corporation to its employee/major shareholder resulted in taxable income to the bor-
rower. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed that decision and applied 
the reasoning of Dean and Greenspun. Hardee, 708 F.2d at 662. 
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pensation levels, a salary substitute transferring funds to the 
recipient with no corresponding income tax liability grew in popu-
larity. Judicial support for this result created an expanding loop-
hole in the elaborate enforcement of tax liability and compromised 
the integrity of the tax system. Larger amounts of money were 
committed to below market loans.36 The enforcement difficulties 
created by the jUdiciary were particularly exacerbated in those 
transactions where the intent to repay the loan was either unclear or 
illusory.37 
B. Case Law Development Under the Gift Tax 
The courts refused to impose income tax liability on below mar-
ket loans; however, they included these transactions within the am-
bit of gift tax liability. In Blackburn v. Commissioner,38 the 
taxpayer transferred property valued at $245,000 to her children in 
exchange for a 414-month note with a face value of $172,517.65 and 
a below market interest rate. The taxpayer acknowledged that the 
excess of the actual property value over the note value was a gift, 
but she challenged the Service's assertion that the note's below mar-
ket interest rate generated an additional gift.39 The Tax Court ruled 
in favor of the Service that the transaction generated an additional 
gift of $37,979.35. That gift amount was computed by calculating 
the difference between the face value of the note ($172,517.65) and 
the fair market value of the note discounted to reflect the below 
market interest rate ($134,538.30).40 This result was consistently 
applied to term loan transactions by later courtS.41 
The gift tax treatment of below market loans was nevertheless 
confused by the courts' refusal to find a gift in the demand loan 
context. In Johnson v. United States,42 the taxpayer lent money 
which was repayable on demand without interest to her children. 
The Service argued that the taxpayer had made a gift on the "use of 
the money" at the then-prevailing interest rate as applied to the av-
36. See, e.g., Bond, The Use of Interest-Free or Low Interest Loans by Publicly Held 
Corporations to Reward Executives, 58 TAXES 542 (1980). 
37. See infra notes 123-36 and accompanying text. 
38. 20 T.C. 204 (1953). 
39. Id. at 206-07. 
40. Id. at 207. The formula used to determine the present value of the note was not 
provided in the case. 
41. Berkman v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979); La Fargue v. Commis-
sioner, 73 T.C. 40 (1973). 
42. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966). 
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erage unpaid balance for each year.43 The District Court held, 
however, that the taxpayer had not made gifts within the meaning 
of section 2501.44 The court reasoned that these loans did not defeat 
the purpose of the gift tax in allowing the taxpayer to avoid estate 
tax by reducing her estate through inter vivos gifts.45 The court 
also ruled that the taxpayer had no right to interest and implied 
that there was "no property right" that would bring the transaction 
within the statute.46 Additionally, the court emphasized that Con-
gress, not the courts, should decide this issue.47 When the Service 
announced its nonacquiescence seven years later, the revenue ruling 
correctly perceived no economically justified reason for distinguish-
ing demand loans from term loans.48 
The first opportunity to determine whether the decision in John-
son or the position in the revenue ruling would be followed by other 
courts came in Crown v. Commissioner.49 This case involved an in-
terest-free demand loan made to the lender's relatives. 50 The Tax 
Court followed the Johnson reasoning to find no taxable gift.51 The 
43. Id. at 76. See also Note, Gift Taxes- Interest-Free Demand Loans Are Not Taxable 
Gifts-Johnson v. United States, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1014, 1014 n.2 (1967) (''The government 
selected the factor of 3-112% from the regulations providing for the valuation of annuities, life 
estates, terms for years, remainders and reversions .... ") (citing brief for defendant). 
44. Johnson, 254 F. Supp. at 77. 
45. Id. The court reasoned that the taxpayer had no duty to lend or invest her money to 
provide additional income. Thus, where the principal of such loans would remain in the 
lender'S estate at death, the making of this loan would have no effect on decreasing the tax-
able estate. Id. See also Note, Dickman v. Commissioner: Gift Tax Consequences of Interest 
Free Loans, 402 ARK. L. REv. 400, 403 (1982). 
46. Johnson, 254 F. Supp. at 77. There is some dispute regarding what the court meant 
by this statement. Some interpret the sentence to mean that because there was no right to 
interest, there was no property right to transfer. See Comment, Gift Taxation of Interest Free 
Loans, 19 STAN. L. REV. 870, 871 (1967). Others interpret the court as implying that, be-
cause there was no right to interest, the transfer was for full and adequate consideration. See 
Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812, 813 (lIth Cir. 1982); see infra note 66 and accom-
panying text. 
47. Johnson, 254 F. Supp. at 73. The court reasoned that a legislative decision would 
allow the people to voice their opinions and would involve a prospective rather than an ex 
post facto application. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
48. Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B.408. 
49. 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978) [the Seventh Circuit deci-
sion hereinafter Crown 11]. 
50. Crown II, 585 F.2d at 234-35. The taxpayer and his brother were equal partners in 
an incorporated company. Prior to and during 1967, the taxpayer made loans of approxi-
mately $18 million to a series of 24 trusts established for the benefit of the children and other 
close relatives of the three brothers. Id. 
51. Crown, 67 T.C. at 1062. In a forceful dissent, Judge Simpson stated that the major-
ity's holding would result in ignoring a gift in excess of one million dollars. Furthermore, he 
stated that the transaction was within the "broad" reach of the statute and that, in fact, 
nearly identical transactions had in earlier cases resulted in gift taxes. He also argued that 
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Service appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Crown 
II).52 That court agreed with the Service's position that the failure 
to tax this loan was inconsistent with the treatment of other practi-
cal alternatives. 53 Additionally, it found the loan inimical to the 
purpose of the gift tax provisions preventing income tax avoid-
ance.54 Despite these "good policy reasons," the circuit court re-
fused to impose a gift tax, noting that "[n]o statutory language or 
statements in the legislative history [had] been cited dealing specifi-
cally with interest-free loans.,,55 The opinion also rejected attempts 
by the Service to bring the transaction within the "broad reach" of 
the statute as an "unequal exchange" or "property right.,,56 In 
reaching its conclusion, the court found that taxing the demand 
loan would create an administrative burden and would be inequita-
ble to the taxpayer. 57 The Service chose not to appeal Crown II, 
fearing that a Supreme Court denial to review the decision would so 
strengthen the taxpayers' position as to make further attack futile. 58 
The lower court cases therefore inconsistently treated below 
market loans. In employer/employee, corporation/shareholder and 
intrafamilial demand loan contexts, below market loans were not 
considered taxable events. 59 Intrafamilial term loans were subject 
to a gift tax based on the difference between the face value of the 
loan and its discounted fair market value.60 The cases failed to 
elaborate any economic or tax principles which justified taxing in-
trafamilial term loans while exempting all other below market loans 
from tax liability. These results had the economically incongruous 
effect of encouraging demand loans and discouraging term loans for 
the purported "widespread ramifications" and administrative problems which would result 
from adoption of the Commissioner's interpretation did not justify the court's decision. He 
believed the decision was "inconsistent with the explicit terms of the statute, its intended 
scope as set forth in the legislative history, long-standing Treasury regulations, and the 
Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of such provision." Id. at 1065-70. 
52. Crown II, 585 F.2d at 234. 
53. Id. at 237. (The court specifically stated that the treatment of interest-free demand 
loans was inconsistent to that of term loans, irrevocable and revocable trusts.) See supra note 
5 and accompanying text. 
54. Crown II, 585 F.2d at 235-36; F. GERHART, THE GIFT TAX 2 (1980). See supra 
note 5 and accompanying text. 
55. Crown II, 585 F.2d at 237. 
56. Id. at 238-40. 
57. Id. at 240-41. The court argued that "[s]imilar reasoning might find ... a gift when 
a neighbor borrows your lawnmower and fails to return it immediately, or when out-of-town 
guests are provided a night's lodging by friends instead of going to a hotel." Id. at 241. 
58. Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States, 
Dickman v. United States, 465 U.S. 330 (1984) (No. 82-1041). 
59. See supra notes 17-38,43-58 and accompanying text. 
60. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. 
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intrafamilial use.61 In addition to this theoretical inconsistency, the 
cases had effectively allowed large wealth transfers to escape tax 
liability. In this climate, the Service intensified its efforts to pres-
sure the Supreme Court or Congress to create a consistent rule sub-
jecting all such transactions to tax liability. 
C. The Dickman Decision 
After Crown II, the Service focused its attention on a different 
demand loan case, Dickman v. United States.62 Esther Dickman 
and her late husband, Paul, made numerous large interest-free de-
mand loans to their son, Lyle, and to Artesian Farms, Inc. (Arte-
sian), a closely held Florida corporation owned by Esther, Paul, 
Lyle, and Lyle's wife and children. After Paul's death in 1976, the 
Commissioner audited his estate and determined that the loans 
made by Paul to Lyle and Artesian resulted in taxable gifts in the 
amount of the value of the use of the loaned funds. Following this 
audit, the Commissioner issued statutory notices of gift tax defi-
ciency to both Esther Dickman and Paul Dickman's estate. The 
notices asserted a deficiency of $42,212.91 against Paul Dickman's 
estate and a deficiency of $41,107.78 against Esther Dickman.63 
Both taxpayers petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of 
the deficiencies. The Tax Court reaffirmed its decision in Crown 
and found that because the loans were intrafamilial demand loans, 
they were not subject to the gift tax.64 On appeal, the Eleventh 
Circuit reversed the Tax Court and found a taxable benefit for gift 
tax purposes where a taxpayer makes an interest-free demand 
10an.65 The Commissioner determined the value of the gift by ap-
plying an interest rate to the balance of each loan outstanding dur-
ing the tax year. 66 
In a seven-to-two decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
Eleventh Circuit.67 It concluded that an accurate reading of the 
61. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text. 
62. 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 620 (1980), rev'd, 690 F.2d 812 (llth Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465 U.S. 
330 (1984). 
63. Dickman, 41 T.C.M. at 620-21. 
64. Id. at 624. 
65. Dickman, 690 F.2d 812, 819 (1982). 
66. Id. at 814 n.4. The court expressed no view on the valuation aspects of this case. It!. 
at 820 n.ll. 
67. Dickman, 465 U.S. 330 (1984). At the time the Supreme Court heard the argu-
ments, 31 similar cases were pending. The estimated tax liabilities in those cases were 
$5,500,000. Memorandum for the Respondent at 25-26, Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 
F.2d 812 (1982) (No. 82-1041). 
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pertinent statutes and committee reports established that the gift 
tax should be imposed on gratuitous transfers, however effectuated. 
The majority stated: "The plain language of the statute reflects this 
legislative history; the gift tax was designed to encompass all trans-
fers of property and property rights having significant value.,,68 
The Supreme Court analogized interest-free demand loans to tenan-
cies at will, stating that "use" under a tenancy at will had long been 
recognized as a property right. The Court found no distinction be-
tween the right to use property under a tenancy at will and the right 
to use money transferred in an interest-free demand loan transac-
tion. Both transactions represent a measurable economic value as-
sociated with the use of the transferred property.69 Interest-free 
demand loans therefore result "in taxable gifts of the reasonable 
value of the use of the money lent. "70 The Supreme Court noted 
that although Congress could change the effect of the decision by 
amending the statute, the result in favor of finding tax liability effec-
tuated congressional intent to protect the estate and gift tax 
system.71 
The Dickman decision unified the gift tax treatment of below 
market loans by SUbjecting both term and demand loans to liability. 
The Court correctly perceived the economic reality of these wealth 
transfers and subjected the exchanged transfer value to gift tax lia-
bility. The case law now provided for different methods of comput-
ing the gift value depending upon whether the parties had made a 
demand or a term loan. Term loan gift value was determined by 
computing the difference between the face amount of the loan and 
its discounted present value.72 The demand loan gift value was cal-
culated annually by imputing an interest rate to the principal bal-
ance outstanding for each year of the loan.73 In the gift tax context, 
however, this difference provided no significant economic incentive 
favoring one type of below market loan over the other, as both were 
effectively subject to a meaningful gift tax. Unfortunately, the deci-
sion did not address the issue of below market loans as compensa-
tion for services or as alternatives for dividends because Dickman 
dealt only with the loans' gift tax implications. In the em-
ployer/employee and corporation/shareholder contexts, the loan 
68. Dickman, 465 U.S. at 334. 
69. Id. at 336-37. 
70. Id. at 344. 
71. Id. 
72. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
73. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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could not be validly characterized as a gift. Both parties to such 
transactions continued to treat the loan as having no meaningful tax 
effect. With the case law virtually unanimous against imposing in-
come tax liability on below market loans, taxpayers could continue 
to take advantage of a significant tax loophole after Dickman. 
D. Section 7872 of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 
After Dickman, Congress was pressed to enact clarifying legisla-
tion. Although happy with Dickman, the Service was still dissatis-
fied with the income tax treatment of below market loans.74 
Taxpayers were unhappy with the Dickman result and the confus-
ing distinction between gift and income tax liability.75 Almost all 
the relevant judicial opinions had stated that regulation of these 
loans was more properly a legislative function.76 Finally, Congress 
felt pressed to increase tax revenues in order to assist in deficit re-
duction.77 It responded by enacting section 7872 of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1984 to provide consistent income and gift tax treatment for 
below market loans.78 
The statute operates on the finding that a loan is a below market 
loan. The first inquiry is whether the transaction satisfies the statu-
tory definition of a "loan."79 The Committee Reports accompany-
ing section 7872 explained that: 
It is intended that the term "loan" be interpreted broadly in light 
of the purposes of the provision. Thus, any transfer of money 
that provides the transferor with a right to repayment may be a 
loan. For example, advances or deposits of all kinds may be 
treated as loans. go 
74. The Service never acquiesced to the Dean line of cases. See supra note 6. 
75. Immediately after Dickman, an interest-free loan between related parties would gen-
erate a taxable gift, but such a loan in an employment setting would have no tax consequences 
because it had been held to generate no income to the borrower. See supra notes 39-42 and 
accompanying text. 
76. Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73, 77 (N.D. Tex. 1966) ("Passage of a law 
providing for tax like the one here contended for should be sought through Congress instead 
of the courts."); Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234, 241 (7th Cir. 1978) ("We express no 
view here as to whether a prospective regulation making such loans taxable would be valid or 
whether, on the other hand, the problem would best be left to Congress."); Crown v. Com-
missioner, 67 T.C. 1060, 1065 (1960) ("Accordingly, if the scope of the gift tax is to be 
expanded to encompass such permissive use, we think it should corne through congressional 
action, and not through necessarily broad judicial interpretation."). 
77. H.R. REp. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1017, 1018, 1021, 1025. 
78. I.R.C. § 7872 (1984). 
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2(a) (1984). 
80. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. & AD. NEWS 1445, 1706. 
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Since the Committee Reports called for a broad interpretation, all 
transactions providing for repayment of a principal amount of 
money fell within the purview of the statute. If no repayment terms 
were provided, the recipient realized gross income at the time of 
transfer. 
The statute distinguishes between demand loans and term loans. 
A "demand loan" is any loan that "is payable in full at any time on 
the demand of the lender" or any non-transferable loan which con-
ditions the benefits of the interest arrangement upon the future per-
formance of substantial services by the individual. 81 A "demand 
loan" is a below market loan if the interest called for on the loan is 
less than the "applicable federal rate."82 A "term loan" is defined 
as "any loan that is not a demand loan.,,83 A term loan is a below 
market loan if the amount of the loan exceeds the present value of 
all payments due under the loan.84 The statute uses a discount rate 
equal to the applicable federal rate as of the date of the loan. The 
applicable federal rate for a term loan depends upon the repayment 
period.85 The difference in interest between the applicable statutory 
rate and the interest anticipated by the terms of a demand or term 
loan is the "foregone" interest. 86 
Section 7872 taxes below market loans by imputing transfers be-
tween lender and borrower. The loans have three basic legislative 
components:87 
1. The loan, regardless of the actual contract terms, is deemed 
to be subject to an interest payment at a statutorily prescribed 
interest rate. 
2. The borrower is treated as paying interest on the loan to the 
lender in the amount of the foregone interest. 
3. The lender makes a gift (in a gratuitous transaction), divi-
dend payment (in a corporation/shareholder situation), or com-
81. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(5) (1984). 
82. ld. § 7872(e)(1)(A). In a demand loan situation, the applicable federal rate is the 
short term rate in effect, compounded semiannuaIly for the period for which the amount of 
foregone interest is determined. 
83. ld. § 7872(f)(6). 
84. ld. § 7872(e)(1)(B). 
85. ld. § 7872 (f)(2)(A). Under § 1274, three possible rates may apply, depending upon 
the length of the loan. The short-term rate applies to loans not exceeding three years, the 
mid-term rate applies to loans exceeding three years but not exceeding nine years, and the 
long-term rate applies to loans exceeding nine years. . 
86. ld. § 7872(e)(2)(A)-(B). 
87. STAFF OF SENATE CoMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CoNG., 2D SESS., DEFICIT REDUC-
TION ACT OF 1984: EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS ApPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON 
MARCH 21, 1984, at 474, 479 (Comm. Print 1984). See also Halperin, Interest in Disguise: 
Taxing the "Time Value of Money", 95 YALE L.J. 506, 512 (1986). 
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pensation payment (in a transaction involving services) to the 
borrower in an amount equal to the foregone interest plus the 
amount of the gift, dividend, or compensation. 
Gift, Dividend, or Compensation 
------ LOAN -----BORROWER 
Imputed Interest at the Statutory Rate 
Congress therefore accepted the Service's arguments by estab-
lishing a system which subjects the below market loan to taxation in 
all contexts. In so doing, it adopted the Supreme Court's reasoning 
in Dickman and extended its reach to include income tax liability. 
The statute therefore effected a significant change in the tax treat-
ment of below market loans by reversing much of the existing case 
law and by at least arguably including all such loans within the 
scope of income or gift tax liability. By applying to the income tax 
the different valuation formulas for term and demand loans created 
by the jUdiciary in the gift tax context, however, section 7872 pro-
vides significant incentives for demand loans and corresponding dis-
incentives for term loans. This result makes little economic sense 
and substantially undercuts the statute's remedial value.88 The full 
impact of this aspect of the statute can be understood by analyzing 
the use of the below market loan in the employment setting. 
II. TAXATION OF BELOW MARKET LOANS AS A 
COMPENSATION SUBSTITUTE 
Although below market loans have been used in the dividend 
and gratuitous transaction settings, their broadest potential use is in 
the employer/employee context as part of a compensation pack-
age.89 Section 7872 radically alters the tax benefits and disadvan-
88. See supra notes 41-42, 67, and accompanying text. 
89. The emphasis of this Article is upon the employer/employee below-market loan, but 
gift loans and corporation/shareholder loans also have tax consequences. Gift loans gener-
ally are treated in a manner that negates any benefits that might have accrued to the parties. 
Regardless of whether the gift loan is a demand or term loan, the borrower is deemed to have 
transferred to the lender, and the lender is deemed to have transferred to the borrower, the 
imputed interest on the last day of the calendar year. When the loan is a demand loan, the 
gift is the amount of interest deemed to have been paid, calculated by using the federal short-
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tages to the employer and the employee utilizing below market 
loans. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 further affects the tax treat-
ment of below market loans. Analysis of the use of the below mar-
ket loan in a particular industry-professional sports-provides an 
understanding of the impact of these changes. 
A. Section 7872 
In the case of a demand loan made by an employer to an em-
ployee, section 7872 treats the employer as receiving interest income 
equal to the foregone interest. However, the section treats the em-
ployer as if he or she paid the "foregone" interest back to the em-
ployee as compensation. Thus, the employer has income from the 
term interest rate under § 7872(a) and (e)(2). The effect of these transfers is to charge the 
lender/donor with two separate tax transactions. The first is the gift of the "imputed inter-
est" to the borrower/donee, and the second is the receipt of income by the lender/donor of 
the imputed interest from the borrower/donee. The borrower/donee, subject to the normal 
limitations on interest deductibility, may deduct the amount of imputed interest he or she is 
deemed to have paid to the lender/donor. The net effect is to treat the parties as if no loan 
had been made: the lender/donor still has income from the principal amount and makes a 
gift of that amount to the borrower/donee. The borrower/donee receives an interest deduc-
tion for his or her deemed interest expense, which should offset what was actually earned 
from the loan proceeds. The parties would have ended up in this position had the 
lender/donor merely kept the loan proceeds, included any earnings in yearly income, and 
then transferred the earnings to the borrower/donee. 
When the gift is a term loan, the gift is deemed to have been made on the day the loan is 
made. The amount of the gift is the excess of the loan principal over the present value of the 
projected payments under the loan. The lender/donor is treated as having issued a debt 
instrument with an original issue discount in the excess amount. Thus, the lender/donor is 
charged with a gift in the amount of the original issue discount at the time of the loan. 
Additionally, at the end of each calendar year that the loan is outstanding, the lender/donor 
is charged with income in the amount of any foregone interest calculated under the applicable 
federal rate for term loans. Subject to the normal limitations, the borrower/donee is entitled 
to an interest deduction for the foregone interest he or she is deemed to have paid to the 
lender on the last day of the year. 
Section 7872(c)(2)(A) and (b) contains a de minimus exemption for gift loans if the pro-
ceeds are not used directly for the purchase of income-producing property. The exemption 
provides that on any day the aggregate outstanding loan balance between individuals does not 
exceed $10,000, § 7872 does not apply. 
The corporation/stockholder loan treatment follows the same statutory pattern as in the 
employer/employee loan. The only substantive difference is that the deemed payment from 
the corporation/lender to the shareholderlborrower is treated as a dividend rather than as 
compensation. Thus, the borrower has the same tax consequences as under an' em-
ployer/employee loan-income in the amount of the "deemed" dividend and a deduction for 
the "deemed" interest payment, subject to interest-deductibility limitations. The corpora-
tion, however, is making a dividend payment rather than paying compensation to an em-
ployee and is not entitled to any deduction for the deemed payment. Thus the corporation 
has income each year in the amount of the foregone interest but has no deduction to offset the 
receipt. For a detailed analysis of the tax treatment of below market gift loans and below 
market corporation/stockholder loans, see Chvisuk, Taxation of Loans Having Below-Market 
Interest Rates, 21 IDAHO L. REv. 257 (1985). 
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interest received and an equal deduction for the compensation paid. 
All such payments are treated as if they had been transferred on the 
last day of the calendar year.90 This is essentially a wash.91 At the 
same time, the employee has income from the extra compensation 
he or she is charged with having received92 but is generally entitled 
to an offsetting interest deduction for the foregone interest he or she 
is deemed to have paid to the employer.93 The following example 
illustrates the effects of a below market demand loan on both the 
employer and the employee. On January 1, 1986, the employer 
loans $100,000 to the employee at a 0% interest rate, payable on 
demand. 
FOREGONE INTEREST 
Jan. 1, 1986 - June 30, 1986 181/365 X 12% X $100,000 $ 5,951 
July 1, 1986 - Dec. 31, 1986 184/365 X 12% X $105,951 $ 6,409 
Total Interest Accrued $5951 + $6409 $12,360 
Less Interest Actually Paid 0 
Foregone Interest $12,360 
The employer is charged with income of $12,360 from the foregone 
interest and receives a $12,360 deduction for the "compensation" 
paid to the employee. The employee is charged with $12,360 com-
pensation income but generally is entitled to a $12,360 deduction 
for interest paid. 
The statutory treatment of below market term loans and the re-
90. I.R.C. § 7872(a)(2) (1984). 
91. A "wash" transaction is one with zero net impact to a taxpayer. The tax-
payer/employer in this situation has received income in the amount of the foregone interest 
but has an equal offsetting deduction for compensation paid to the employee. The net effect 
to the employer is the cancelling of income and deduction. 
92. In employer/employee below market loan transactions, the employer is deemed to 
have paid compensation to the employee in the amount of "foregone interest" in the demand 
loan or of the term loan original issue discount. Under § 7872(f)(9) this employee compensa-
tion is not subject to income tax withholding, but there is no saving provision for withholding 
under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. § 3101, Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 
736, 68A Stat. 1. Neither is there a saving provision for withholding under the Federal Un-
employment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (1982), Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 1. 
The employer therefore may be required to withhold specified amounts and to pay any em-
ployer's contribution under these acts. 
The administrative burden of both FICA and FUTA can generally be avoided in the 
demand loan situation, as the imputed payments of the demand loans are deemed to have 
been made on the last day of the calendar year when the statutory limits for withholding have 
already been exceeded. This may not be so under a term loan, since employee compensation 
under a term loan is deemed to have been made on the date the loan is made, which may be 
before the employee has surpassed the annual limits of FICA and FUTA withholding. 
93. This will generally result in a wash to the employee. But see infra note 101. 
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sulting tax consequences are substantially different from those for 
below market demand loans. In the term loan context, the em-
ployee is construed as receiving, at the time the loan is made, com-
pensation in the amount of the excess of the actual loan over the 
present value of the total amount of principal and interest payments 
due under the 10an.94 The excess of the amount of the loan over the 
present value of an payments to be received under the loan is con-
sidered an original issue discount.9s The term loan treatment pro-
vides for the foregone interest of the entire loan period to be 
charged to the employee in the year the loan is made. The em-
ployee is generally entitled to deduct the "interest payments," but 
under section 163 he or she is required to spread the deemed interest 
payments over the entire term of the loan, taking only a ratable 
share each year.96 
Thus, the below market term loan creates a situation far differ-
ent from the below market demand loan "wash." Under a demand 
loan, the foregone interest is calculated on an annual basis coinci-
dent with an annual (and generally offsetting) interest deduction to 
the employee. The income and deduction will generally offset and 
result in no tax liability to the employee. However, the unwary or 
uninformed term loan borrower could face significant adverse tax 
consequences from such a loan arrangement.97 Although the total 
deduction allowed to the employee for the interest should eventu-
ally equal the income with which he or she is charged, the statute 
imposes four significant tax disadvantages on the borrower of a be-
low market term loan. First, the deductions for "interest paid" will 
not offset the income generated in the year of the loan. For exam-
ple, over a fifteen-year below market term loan, the borrower de-
ducts only a ratable portion98 of the "interest" each year, although 
the entire amount of foregone interest was reported in the year the 
loan was made. Second, by deferring the deductions over the life of 
the loan, the taxpayer has lost the use of the money saved through 
94. I.R.C. § 7872(b)(1) (1984). 
95. ld. § 7872(b)(2)(A). 
96. ld. § 163(e); § 1272(a)(I)-(3). 
97. ld. § 7872(c)(3)(A)-(B) provides a de minimus exception to the tax treatment of 
both employer/employee and corporate/shareholder loans. The exception provides that 
these loans will not be subject to the statutory treatment on any day on which the aggregate 
loans between the parties do not exceed $10,000. This exception, however, does not apply to 
any loan that has the principal purpose of tax avoidance. 
In determining the aggregate loans between lender and borrower, the Code treats a hus-
band and wife as one person, so all loans between lender/spouse and borrower/spouse are 
aggregated. ld. § 7872(f)(7). 
98. See infra note 106. 
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the deduction. Thus, the income tax is due in the first year, but the 
final dollars of deduction (and tax savings) are delayed until the 
loan terminates. Third, as in any tax deduction situation, a deduc-
tion is always more valuable to a higher bracket taxpayer. Defer-
ring the interest deduction over the life of the loan may cause some 
of the deduction to come in lower bracket years when the earning 
potential of the taxpayer has declined.99 Finally, the interest is de-
ductible to the same extent as actual interest paid by a taxpayer on 
any loan. Thus, if a taxpayer does not itemize or if the deduction 
were disallowed under other Code provisions,lOO the taxpayer would 
lose the benefit of the deduction. 101 
The employer, however, benefits from such an arrangement. He 
or she is treated as having "paid compensation" to the employee in 
the year of the loan in an amount equal to the excess of the loan 
over the present value of the total principal and interest payments 
to be received under the loan.102 The employer is thereby entitled 
to an "accelerated" deduction for the compensation deemed paid to 
the employee. At the same time, the employer realizes "income" in 
the amount of foregone interest, but only in the ratable yearly share 
which the employee is deemed to pay. 
The following example illustrates the effects to the employer and 
the employee: 
The employer, on January 1, 1985, makes an interest-free loan of 
$100,000 to the employee, payable in fifteen years. Assume the 
current interest rate is 10%, compounded semi-annually. 
Amount of Loan ......................................... $100,000 
Less: 
1) Present value of principal repayment at 10% .. . . . . .. 23,138 
2) Present value of actual interest payments at 10% ... 0 
----
$76,862 
The $76,862 represents the original issue discount. As a result, the 
99. The taxpayer may not always be in a lower bracket in the later years of the loan, but 
this situation is more likely to occur with athletes who enjoy a relatively short career. Foot-
ball players generally average only 3.6 high-earning career years. This analysis does not take 
into account the tax consequences that might result from a change in marital status. For an 
analysis of the impact of such a change, see Chapman, Marriage Neutrality: An Old Idea 
Comes of Age, 87 w. VA. L. REv. 335 (1984). 
100. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162(d), 265 (1982). 
101. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1984 u.s. CoDE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 1445, 1700. 
102. See supra note 95. 
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parties will have the following consequences:103 
103. 
Total 
Loan Interest 
Date O.I.D. Balance For Year 
Year 1 111 $23138.00 
6/30 $1156.90 24294.90 
12/31 1214.75 25509.05 $2371.65 
Year 2 6/30 1275.44 26785.09 
12/31 1339.21 28124.30 2614.65 
Year 3 6/30 1406.17 29530.77 
12/31 1476.48 31006.95 2882.65 
Year 4 6/30 1550.31 32557.26 
12/31 1627.82 34185.08 3178.13 
Year 5 6/30 1709.21 35894.29 
12/31 1794.67 37688.96 3503.88 
Year 6 6/30 1884.41 39573.37 
12/31 1978.63 41552.00 3863.04 
Year 7 6/30 2077.56 43629.56 
12/31 2181.44 45811.00 4259.00 
Year 8 6/30 2290.51 48101.51 
12/31 2405.03 50506.54 4696.54 
Year 9 6/30 2525.28 53031.82 
12/31 2651.55 55683.37 5176.83 
Year 10 6/30 2784.13 58467.50 
12/31 2923.33 61390.83 5707.46 
Year 11 6/30 3069.50 64460.33 
12/31 3222.97 67683.30 6292.47 
Year 12 6/30 3384.12 71067.42 
12/31 3553.33 74620.75 6937.45 
Year 13 6/30 3731.00 78351.75 
12/31 3917.55 82269.30 7649.35 
Year 14 6/30 4113.42 86382.72 
12/31 4319.09 90701.81 8432.51 
Year 15 6/30 4535.05 95236.86 
12/31 4761.80 99998.66 9296.85 
504 
Year of 
Loan 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
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Employer 
Income Deduction 
$2,371.65 
2,614.65 
2,882.65 
3,178.13 
3,503.88 
3,863.04 
4,259.00 
4,695.54 
5,176.83 
5,707.46 
6,292.47 
6,937.45 
7,648.55 
8,432.51 
9,296.85 
$76,862 
Employee 
Income Deduction 
$76,862 $2,371.65 
2,614.65 
2,882.65 
3,178.13 
3,503.88 
3,863.04 
4,259.00 
4,695.54 
5,176.83 
5,707.46 
6,292.47 
6,937.45 
7,648.55 
8,432.51 
9,296.85 
Section 7872 therefore maintains the tax exempt status of below 
market demand loans, since both the employer and the employee 
possess an income/deduction "wash" in most settings. However, 
the legislation significantly alters the tax implications of below mar-
ket term loans by providing employers with a tax benefit and by 
imposing upon employees a meaningful tax disincentive. The stat-
ute clearly favors demand loans over term loans. Although this 
provision succeeds in taxing the heretofore more prevalent form of 
below market loan, the encouragement of demand loans represents 
a poor and potentially biased economic judgment. Demand loans 
are often vehicles for significant tax abuse because parties frequently 
employ a demand loan format as a sham when they have no actual 
intention of repaying the loan. Taxpayers could also avoid the re-
medial effects of section 7872 by structuring the below market loan 
as a demand loan with a separate understanding that it will be re-
paid only at a certain time-in effect a tax-free term loan. Demand 
loans also favor lenders, since the transaction is risk-free for them-
if they need the money back or become disenchanted with the bor-
rower for any reason, they can simply demand repayment of the 
principal. Finally, term loans are better vehicles for borrowers le-
gitimately in need of investment capital, as the conditions of interest 
and repayment are established and predictable. 104 The 1984legisla-
tion therefore encourages use of the most economically inefficient 
type of below market loan and may penalize the unwary borrower. 
104. See TERM LOAN HANDBOOK 37-45,143-51 (J. McCann ed. 1983) (ABA Comm. on 
Developments in Bus. Fin., Sec. Corp., Banking and Bus. Law). 
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Congress produced this result by engrafting the different valua-
tion formulas for demand and term loans created by the judiciary in 
the gift tax context upon the income tax. lOS The assessment of the 
demand loan gift tax liability on an annual basis provided no incen-
tive favoring demand over term loans, since a substantially 
equivalent gift tax was imposed on both types of loans. The income 
tax, unlike the gift tax, possesses an annual deduction for the pay-
ment of certain types of interest.106 An annual valuation of income 
in the salary or dividend setting therefore results in the demand 
loan retaining its tax exempt status. Section 7872 fails to attain sig-
nificant tax neutrality by providing substantial incentives for the de-
mand loan rather than the term loan. This lack of neutrality is 
more harmful where the favored transaction is less economically 
efficient. 
Congress should have subjected demand loans to a meaningful 
income tax rather than to the illusory tax treatment in section 7872. 
One method would tax demand loans in a manner similar to the 
treatment presently applied to revocable trustsl07 or anticipatory as-
signments of income from income-producing property. lOS Thus, the 
lender would be required to report as income each year the excess of 
any income actually earned from the loan proceeds over the actual 
interest charged on the loan. This would provide a disincentive to 
employers making demand loans to employees as part of compensa-
tion packages. 
An alternative method would impute a statutory "term" for all 
demand loans and would value them accordingly. For example, all 
demand loans could initially be treated as a five-year term loan for 
valuation purposes. The tax treatment could parallel the tax treat-
ment of any five-year term loan. l09 Any demand loan outstanding 
after five years could be treated as a new five-year term loan and 
valued accordingly. Either of these alternatives would impose a 
105. See supra notes 41-42,67 and accompanying text. 
106. I.R.C. § 163 (1982). 
107. Except as provided in §§ 671-678, when the settlor has created a revocable trust, the 
income each year is charged to the settlor of the trust regardless of who has been designated 
as the income beneficiary. See generally I.R.C. §§ 641-643 (1982). Thus, the settlor of the 
trust retains the income tax liability, and if the income is paid to a beneficiary other than the 
settlor, he or she is also subject to the gift tax. 
108. When a taxpayer has made an anticipatory assignment of income from income-pro-
ducing property, the assignment successfully shifts the income to the assignee but fails to shift 
the income tax liability from the taxpayer. In order to successfully shift both the income and 
the income tax liability to the assignee, the taxpayer must transfer ownership of the income-
producing property. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940). 
109. See supra notes 95, 104, and accompanying text. 
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meaningful tax consequence upon the use of below market demand 
loans. The income tax, like the gift tax currently in effect in section 
7872, would then treat both demand and term loans in a substan-
tially equivalent manner. This tax neutrality would mean that true 
economic benefits rather than tax avoidance considerations would 
dictate the choice of the term or demand loan format if a below 
market loan were still valuable to the parties. 
B. New Legislation 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986110 substantially impacts upon the 
deductibility of below market loans in two separate areas-tax rates 
and interest deduction availability. 
The new legislation lowers the maximum tax rate to 28% by 
1988.111 This reduction imposes an additional penalty on term bor-
rowers. For taxpayers who received below market loans prior to 
1987, the income generated by the foregone interest calculation in 
the year in which the loan was issued very likely was taxed at 
50%.112 On the other hand, the deductions for interest that is dis-
bursed over the life of the loan will probably be taken against 28% 
of income. 113 A taxpayer will lose $.22 on each dollar of deduction 
because of the change in the rate schedules. 
The new legislation also eliminates the deduction for consumer 
interest, with the exception of interest on a principal residence and 
possibly a second residence. 114 The interest deduction on the 
purchase of other consumer products, such as cars, boats, and any 
items of personal use, is abolished. Additionally, the new legislation 
expands the scope of the interest limitation and generally restricts 
deductibility of investment interest. 115 As a result, the taxpayer in 
the below market loan situation could face restricted deductions or, 
at the worst, no deduction for his or her "deemed interest expense." 
A borrower of either a demand or term loan would therefore have 
income from the loan without any offsetting deductions. Such a 
result significantly increases the tax disadvantages for either type of 
below market loan. Further, the borrower actually controls interest 
deductibility by investing the principal in a qualifying (e.g., princi-
110. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
AD. NEWS Special Tax Pamphlet. 
111. Id. § 101(a)(I) (amending I.R.C. § 1). 
112. I.R.C. § 1 (1982). 
113. Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 1. But see id. § 1(g) for imposition of 5% surtax. 
114. Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 511(h) (amending I.R.C. § 163). 
115. Id. at § 511(d) (amending I.R.C. § 163(d». 
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pal residence) or a non-qualifying (e.g., car or boat) transaction. 
An uninformed choice could have severe tax consequences to the 
unwary taxpayer. 
C. Below Market Loans in the Professional Sports Industry 
The professional sports industry has utilized below market loans 
as part of a total financial package for many of its highest paid ath-
letes.116 Sports contracts therefore provide a vehicle for examining 
the modem use of below market loans as compensation. These con-
tracts are also excellent examples for illustrating how the statutory 
provisions alter the economic utility of such loans. Finally, below 
market loans in the sports industry frequently involve an under-
standing between the parties regarding repayment. Contractual 
conditions which alter the obligation to repay will have significant 
income tax ramifications. 
1. The Effect of Section 7872 
The most commonly utilized form of below market loan in the 
professional sports industry, the term loan, has been most affected 
by the changes in the tax laws.117 For example, a team loans its first 
round draft pick $400,000 interest free to be repaid fifteen years 
from the date he or she executes the promissory note with the club. 
Under the law prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1984, the employer, 
at the time of the loan, did not receive a deduction for the principal 
amount of the loan since it was not considered a salary or business 
expense, but rather a commercial investment.118 Similarly, the ath-
lete received the face amount of the loan tax free because the money 
was not considered income but instead was treated as the incurring 
of indebtedness. The arrangement had no significant economic 
benefit for the team aside from any negotiation advantages which it 
may have acquired in structuring the financial package. The player, 
116. J. WEISTANT & C. LoWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 848-49 (1979). In professional 
football, 46 veteran National Football League (NFL) players negotiated loans in 1983 with an 
average value of $109,000, and 96 veteran NFL players negotiated loans in 1984 with an 
average value of $249,166. Five of the 28 players chosen in the first round of the 1983 NFL 
draft negotiated loans with an average value of $248,000, and 19 of 28 players chosen in the 
first round of the 1984 draft negotiated loans with an average value of $514,000. Additional 
loans were generated through later rounds of each draft. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
PLAYER'S Ass'N, 1983 DRAFT CoMPENSATION BREAKDOWN (Feb. 1984); 1984 Salary Sur-
vey, LAWDIBLE, Feb./Mar. 1985, at 1-2, 3 (AFL-CIO Legal Dept., Fed'n of Prof. Athletes). 
Among the players chosen in the first round of the 1985 draft, the average loan had a value of 
$452,499. 1985 Draft Compensation by Round, LAWDIBLE, Feb. 1986. 
117. See supra notes 95-104 and accompanying text. 
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7 (1958). 
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on the other hand, received a large sum of money at signing which 
was considered tax free. 
Under the new statute, the tax implications for both parties have 
changed considerably. Since the employer is considered as having 
paid compensation to the employee in an amount equal to the ex-
cess of the face amount of the loan over the present value of the 
loan, the club receives a deduction of $307,449 in the year of sign-
ing. 119 This deduction is in effect "recaptured" over the fifteen-year 
term of the loan, because the team is required to report as income 
each year the interest attributed to it by the statute (in this example, 
$20,497). For the athlete, the tax situation is reversed. The em-
ployee is now charged with $307,449 in taxable income in the year 
of signing. He or she will eventually be made whole after the loan 
has run its term because the new law allows an annual interest de-
duction (again, $20,497). However, the team procures a significant 
financial advantage, and the player receives a significant financial 
disadvantage, given the present value dollar effect in the year of 
signing. The transaction is even more disadvantageous for the 
player if the annual interest deduction is lost by commiting the prin-
cipal to investments which do not qualify for the interest 
deduction. 120 
The legislation therefore encourages players who wish to utilize 
below market loans as part of their compensation package to struc-
ture the loans as demand loans or some variant which avoids the 
imputed interest calculation. 121 These alternatives effectively dis-
courage the use of below market loans, since the demand loan 
119. This is the original issue discount on a $400,000 interest free loan for 15 years using 
a 10% applicable rate. See supra notes 96, 104, and accompanying text for the method used 
to calculate the original issue discount. 
120. I.R.C. § 265(2) (1982); Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 511(h). 
121. A variant on this "straight" interest-free loan is a loan from the team at a near-
market rate of interest. The club then builds into the player's athletic contract an easily 
earned reporting or performance bonus in an amount equal to the yearly interest charge. 
This produces a loan which in effect is interest free. The club reports the interest as 
income but receives a corresponding deduction for the payment of the bonus to its employee. 
The player reports the reporting or performance bonus as income but receives an equivalent 
deduction for his or her interest expense payment to the team. Structuring the loan in this 
manner allows both parties to avoid the attributed interest rate mandated by the new statute. 
The relevant numbers are completely in the control of the drafting parties. However, since 
the player's interest payment is an obligation, separate from his or her athletic contract, the 
player must insure that he or she receives the appropriate bonus for each year the loan is 
outstanding. The player therefore must either take a short-term loan or accept a longer-term 
athletic contract. In addition, if the player could have negotiated the identical reporting or 
performance bonus without the inclusion of the loan as part of the package, the loan is not 
truly interest free. 
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places an already vulnerable athlete under more managerial control. 
Unfortunately, many players continue to use the term loan format 
and to ignore the impact of section 7872 by treating the loan as tax 
free. 122 The Service will deter this practice as it audits and penal-
izes taxpayers for disregarding the statute. In the professional 
sports context, the elimination of borrowing will ultimately benefit 
athletes economically, given the significant non-tax disadvantages to 
the borrowing player. 123 
2. Terms of Repayment 
Athletes have frequently employed below market loans in a con-
tractual structure where the intent to repay the loan is illusory. 
Such transactions reveal that, as a compensation substitute, the be-
low market loan possesses no real economic value aside from its 
potential tax-avoidance benefit. A popular variant of the below 
market loan is the use of a player's deferred compensation payout 
or of an easily met performance bonus (most typically reporting to 
training camp) to repay the principal when due. 124 This type of 
transaction begins with the establishment of a below market term 
loan, e.g., $500,000 loaned interest free to the player from team 
funds, repayable in fifteen years. As an additional but contractually 
separate part of the player's financial package, the team agrees to 
pay the athlete a sum of money equal to the face amount of the loan 
as a signing bonus or salary, but the player defers receipt of that 
income until the date the loan is due to be repaid, e.g., a $500,000 
signing bonus to be paid to the player fifteen years from the date of 
signing. If the loan is short term, the repayment schedule may cor-
respond to a series of reporting bonuses which begin each year of 
the player's athletic contracts, e.g., a player receives a $500,000 loan 
122. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
123. Aside from the tax consequences, the loan's economic value to the player lies in the 
yearly rate of return he or she can generate from investing it or in the after-tax worth of the 
interest expense saved by not having to buy a conventional loan to acquire property (e.g., a 
house). The loan arrangement is potentially disastrous for the player if he or she fails to 
invest the proceeds in an asset which retains or increases its value until the repayment period. 
For example, if the loan is used to pay an agent's fee, to buy a depreciating asset (e.g., a car) 
or to invest in a speculative opportunity which fails, the athlete may be "cash poor" at the 
time of repayment. The player could therefore become insolvent at a poor economic time-
the last years of the playing career or the lower income non-sports years following the 
player'S athletic retirement. Many players also seem to believe that the team does not actu-
ally expect the loan to be repaid. This illusion will probably be shattered as teams sue players 
for principal amounts due and owing. See NEG Report, USA Today, Aug. 25, 1986, at 8C, 
col. 7. 
124. See. e.g., Wallets Openedfor USEL Talent, The Sporting News, Aug. 25, 1986, at 42, 
col. 4. 
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at the time of signing the contract which must be repaid in install-
ments of $100,000 two years from the date of the loan, $150,000 
three years from the date of the loan, and $250,000 four years from 
the date of the loan. The player's athletic contracts contain report-
ing bonuses of $100,000 before he or she begins the third season, 
$150,000 before the fourth season, and $250,000 before the fifth 
season. 
This agreement, particularly the longer term loan secured by de-
ferred compensation, is fraught with peril for the player. The below 
market term loan would be subject to the present value tax result 
mandated by the new statute and discussed previously.125 If the 
player or agent is unaware of the effect of section 7872, he or she 
will improperly assess the economic value of the below market loan 
and the entire compensation package. This oversight will eventu-
ally result in the payment of past due tax, interest, and penalties to 
the Service. 126 However, this tax is not imposed merely upon the 
use of the money, or foregone interest. These types of below market 
loans also subject the player to economic and tax difficulties for the 
principal amount. 
The shorter term loan will be repaid during the heart of the ath-
lete's prime earning years, and the athlete is therefore less likely to 
be cash poor at that time. In both situations, however, the player 
carries a significant tax liability with no corresponding offsetting liq-
uid income. At the time the loan is due to be repaid, the team en-
gages in a purely paper transaction which records the loan as paid 
in full, credits the player with an income payment in the amount of 
the deferred compensation, and takes a deduction for the team in 
the same amount. 127 The club notifies the player of the player's 
receipt of income equal to the face amount of the loan.128 However, 
he or she receives no actual cash from the team at that time and 
must therefore satisfy the tax liability from other liquid assets. For 
example, a player does not report income on the $500,000 loan re-
ceived at the time of signing the contract. Fifteen years from that 
date (the repayment year), the club notifies the player that the loan 
has been repaid and credits the player with receipt of $500,000 of 
income. In year fifteen, the player receives no actual monies from 
the team, but, assuming a 28% tax bracket, the player now owes the 
125. See supra notes 104, 115, 118-20, and accompanying text. 
126. See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1 (1959). 
128. I.R.C. § 451(a) (1954). 
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government $140,000.129 If the player has invested the original 
$500,000 wisely or is still playing and earning a high salary, the 
scheme has some economic value to the player, and his or her finan-
cial posture is healthy. However, as more frequently happens, if the 
player has engaged in an undisciplined investment plan or has in-
dulged in a lavish lifestyle and now generates a lower income from a 
non-athletic career, the transaction is a financial nightmare for the 
player. The scheme which the athlete believed would result in tax-
free income has merely deferred tax liability to a time when the 
player is less able to pay it. The athlete's prospects are even more 
bleak if a substantial portion of the tax-free money received at the 
time of signing was used to pay the fee of the agent who structured 
the package. 
This type of below market loan structure also disadvantages the 
player in the tax liability on the principal amount. In this type of 
arrangement, the player's failure to report income in the year of 
loan receipt may violate the constructive receipt of income doctrine 
for deferred compensation.130 The player actually receives in the 
year of signing all the money which for tax reporting purposes will 
be "deferred." This transaction on its face may be a sham and a 
fraud on the Service.131 Constructive receipt of deferred funds oc-
curs if the money is "credited to his account, set apart for him, or 
otherwise made available so that he may draw upon it.,,132 Even if 
the loan and deferred compensation are drafted as contractually in-
dependent transactions, the Service may rather easily pierce 
through to the economic reality of the contracts where the amounts 
and years were identical. If the Service successfully took this posi-
tion, the player would owe unpaid taxes, interest charges, and pen-
alties based on the principal amount of the loan. 133 
Occasionally a club will relieve a player from the obligation to 
repay a negotiated loan. This forgiveness can occur during the life 
of the loan or at the date of actual repayment. The team may be 
motivated by a desire to alleviate some financial problems of its for-
mer players, but the forgiveness is more often the product of the 
club's negotiating a new financial package with the player or re-
working or renegotiating an existing contractual arrangement. If 
129. Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 1. 
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1979). 
131. Gregory v. Helvering. 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932). rev'd, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd 
293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1979). 
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-1 (1985). 
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the team forgives the indebtedness, the taxable event is the forgive-
ness.134 At that point, the club is entitled to a deduction for the face 
value of the amount forgiven as a payment to an employee. At the 
same time, the player has imputed income equivalent to the for-
given amount. The player's tax liability, depending on the bracket 
and year, will most likely equal 28% ofthe face amount of the loan. 
A different type of problem is posed when the contract contains 
a conditional forgiveness clause. A typical agreement establishes an 
interest-free loan for a term equivalent to the length of the player's 
athletic contract. The agreement further states that the loan will be 
forgiven if the player complies with a certain condition before the 
repayment date. The most frequent condition is the execution of an 
additional athletic financial package with the team. As noted 
above, the team receives a deduction, and the player is charged with 
income in the face amount of the loan at the time the loan is for-
given. If the provision is a valid condition and not a sham (Le., if 
the player will certainly fulfill it), the transaction will have no other 
tax consequences aside from the present value calculation discussed 
previously. 135 
The seriousness of these types of problems have not yet been 
fully appreciated by members of the professional sports industry. 
Most large financial packages for athletes began to be structured 
during 1979 and 1980,136 with the below market loan as a compen-
sation tool being introduced even later. Therefore, most of the be-
low market loans have yet to come due for repayment. In all 
probability, many of the tax years in which these packages were 
negotiated have not yet come under Service audit scrutiny.137 In 
earlier years, when athletes were making much less money and ex-
otic compensation schemes were unknown, the Service had little in-
centive to devote significant resources to investigating athletes. 
However, given the pUblicity accorded large financial player pack-
ages and the questionable nature of some compensation arrange-
ments, difficulties between players and the Service will inevitably 
occur in the near future. 
134. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12 (1954). 
135. See supra notes 104, 115, 118-20, and accompanying text. 
136. Large player compensation packages are generally attributable to greater bargaining 
leverage by labor, both collectively and individually, and to increased income available to 
sports management from the broadcast industry. See Closius, Not at the Behest of Nonlabor 
Groups: A Revised Prognosis for a Maturing Sports Industry, 25 B.C.L. REv. 341 (1983). 
137. I.R.C. § 6501 provides that the statute of limitations for the assessment of tax is 
generally three years from the filing of the return. Thus, for example, returns filed in 1984 for 
tax year 1983 are open to Service review until at least 1987. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Below market loans had been utilized as substitutes for salaries, 
dividends, and gifts. In these settings, however, the transactions 
possessed no independent economic value as loans but merely em-
ployed the loan format as a tax-avoidance device. Lower court 
opinions encouraged the use of this technique by failing to perceive 
the true nature of the exchange of wealth merely because the trans-
fer was labelled a loan. Use of the below market loan as a salary 
substitute was the most abusive practice. As exemplified by profes-
sional sports contracts, many compensation packages were struc-
tured so that the loan either was not intended to be repaid or was to 
be cancelled by an accounting adjustment. These transactions had 
no economic utility as a loan but merely adopted that form in an 
effort to compensate or to transfer wealth without SUbjecting the 
exchange to taxation. In professional sports, the desire to obtain 
immediate tax benefits often led players to include below market 
loans in their compensation packages when, in fact, such loans were 
detrimental to their long-term financial security. Subjecting the ex-
change to tax would therefore restore the integrity of the tax struc-
ture and limit the below market loan to those situations in which 
the borrowing exhibits independent economic value to the parties. 
The Supreme Court in Dickman subjected both demand and 
term loans in the intrafamilial setting to the gift tax. Congress sub-
jected all below market loans, according to their factual setting, to 
the appropriate income or gift tax. However, by applying the differ-
ent valuation formulas for term and demand loans endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in the gift tax context to the income tax setting, 
Congress favored the use of demand loans as a salary substitute by 
leaving them effectively tax free while imposing a heavy tax burden 
on the term borrower. This bias resulted because the income tax, 
unlike the gift tax, allows an interest deduction which produces a 
tax wash in an annual assessment of gain as opposed to the mean-
ingful gift tax liability generated by a yearly computation. This re-
sult encourages the use of a loan type which is least economically 
efficient and most likely to be a sham transaction. Congress should 
have achieved tax neutrality by SUbjecting both kinds of loans to a 
meaningful income tax consequence. This result can be produced 
by subjecting demand loans to current income tax. Congress can 
achieve this goal by ascribing the borrower's below market benefit 
to the lender or by statutorily imputing a term of years to all de-
mand loans. This final reform would eliminate a significant tax-
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avoidance device and would ultimately protect unwary borrowers 
from the disadvantageous economic effects which frequently accom-
pany below market loans. 
